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I
n The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argued that an
individual acting in his self-interest will tend to benefit
the common good. Guided by an “invisible hand,” 
competition that arises out of the natural desire to improve
one’s lot in life will lead to efficient market outcomes. For
example, a gardener tends to a businessman’s yard with care
and at a reasonable price, not because he is particularly con-
cerned with the businessman’s well-being but rather to make
a living. The gardener receives the money, the businessman
gets the service he desires, and both are better off. This
transaction is merely part of the larger, interconnected 
network of mutually beneficial relationships that enhance a
society’s well-being.
But there are situations in which the individual interest
runs counter to the public interest. For instance, a decision
may be rational on the individual level in the short run 
but counterproductive for everyone over the long run. 
This often occurs when there is large group consumption 
of exhaustible resources. Ecologist
Garrett Hardin coined the conflict a
“tragedy of the commons.” His classic
example is that of herders adding cattle
to graze on a common pasture. It is
entirely rational for an individual
herder to add cattle to the land and
thereby increase his harvest. However,
if all of the herders continue this
process, they will overgraze the pas-
ture, destroy it, and all will be worse off
in the long run. A negative externality, or the unintended
side effect of one person’s actions harming another, results
from the individual herder’s behavior.
Policymakers have often tried to lessen the negative
effects of such common-use problems by regulation — in
particular, by setting limits on the available use of the 
common resource. But regulation is often very costly for
both regulators and the regulated alike. Monitoring compli-
ance can be difficult for government regulators, while
complying with regulations can force firms to adopt 
expensive technologies and slow production. Moreover, 
it’s unclear how well regulations actually protect the 
intended resource. If the regulation is badly constructed, 
for example, a firm could deem a punitive measure for 
their defection cheaper than undertaking the necessary
adjustments to meet regulations. 
So instead many economists favor more market-based
approaches. Tops on their list is permit trading. In his 1960
paper “The Problem of Social Cost,” economist Ronald
Coase now of the University of Chicago argued that the 
negative externality can be eliminated by allowing parties 
to bargain privately among themselves. 
Consider how permit trading may work in the case of air
pollution. First, the government establishes a limit on the
total amount of pollution. It then issues permits equal to a
specific number of units of pollution. Those permits are
bought and sold among companies. Firms that find reducing
pollution relatively expensive will purchase permits from
firms that find cutting back less costly. In the end, the cap on
total pollution limit is met, but firms have bargained toward
this solution in a way that is more efficient than traditional
regulation.
In a 2003 paper published in the Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, Tom Tietenberg of Colby College reviews
the effectiveness of permit trading in modern-day applica-
tions. He cites permit-trading programs in the United States
that have reduced pollution at relatively low costs, arguing
that some have actually produced positive externalities by
lowering the levels of other air pollutants
not specifically targeted. In addition,
permit trading has found its way into
the international Kyoto Protocol and
European Parliament pollution laws.
Tietenberg also tracks permit trad-
ing’s modern history in the fishing
industry, which has yielded more mixed
results. The unregulated fishing industry
is similar to Hardin’s pasture-herder
example: Fishermen tend to overharvest
the limited supply of fish, depleting the stock for the next
season. As a result, select areas have instituted permit-trading
programs. However, it’s been found that some fishermen
have discarded loads of low-valued fish, resulting in their
deaths, to make way for higher-valued fish. This allows fish-
ermen to meet their quota, but it doesn’t necessarily enhance
the health of the industry as a whole.
What’s more, even when permit-trading systems have
yielded efficiency gains, there are still concerns about
whether the results are just. Usually, these critiques center
on the initial allocation of permit rights, which can have 
significant distributional consequences. Indeed, squabbles
over who gets what are often a stumbling block to a permit-
trading system even getting off the ground. 
In any case, findings from both theory and practice have
proven useful in understanding tragedy of the commons
problems. While traditional regulations may prove useful in
some circumstances, often it is more desirable to establish a
framework in which private firms can largely resolve the
problems themselves.  RF
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